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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the changing transmission mechanism of monetary
policy by introducing a model whose parameter evolution explicitly depends on the conduct of
monetary policy. We ￿nd that the model ￿ts the data well, in particular when complemented
with an estimated break around 1985 that could be associated with the re-gained credibility
of the central bank. The responses of output and in￿ ation to policy shocks change not only
because of the break in 1985 but also according to the monetary policy stance: policy shocks
have stronger negative e⁄ects when policy is tight. There is also evidence in favour of large
changes in the volatility of the output equation, but not of in￿ ation. A set of counterfactual
experiments indicate that good policy and good luck contributed to the ￿great moderation￿ , but
neither of them can fully explain it. A more general variation in the model dynamics underlying
the shock transmission mechanism is required.1 Introduction
There is by now a vast literature on the relative role of good luck and good policy in determining the
reduction in the volatility of key US macroeconomic aggregates, known as the "great moderation".
In econometric terms, the debate is on whether changes in the parameters of the conditional mean
of the variables matter more or less than changes in their conditional variances, and on how to
model the pattern of time-variation. The conditional means have been modeled by means of
VAR models in early contributions (e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2005), Sims and Zha (2006)) and
of small scale DSGE models in more recent contributions (e.g., Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
Benati and Surico (2008), Inoue and Rossi (2009), Davig and Doh (2009), Bianchi (2009)). The
pattern of time variation in the mean is captured either by slowly evolving parameters, typically
modelled as random walks with small innovation variance, e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2005), or by
abruptly changing parameters whose evolution is determined by an unobservable Markov chain,
e.g., the Markov switching speci￿cation of Sims and Zha (2006), Davig and Doh (2009), Bianchi
(2009). Time variation in the variance is typically modelled by means of a stochastic volatility
speci￿cation, e.g., Sims and Zha (2006). While the results in the literature are mixed, overall there
appears to be limited evidence of relevant changes in the conditional means, and more support
for changing variance of the shocks. However, formal statistical tests to discriminate between the
two hypotheses have in general low power (see e.g. the simulation results in Cogley and Sargent
(2005)).
The contribution of our paper to this literature is that we explicitly link the parameter temporal
evolution to the conduct of monetary policy. More speci￿cally, since good monetary policy is
typically associated to following a standard Taylor-type rule (e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2007)), we allow
the parameters of the conditional mean and the conditional variance of key macroeconomic variables
to vary depending on the extent of the deviation of actual monetary policy from that required by
the adoption of the rule suggested by Taylor (1993). In other words, the model parameters can
alternate depending on whether monetary policy is tight, neutral or loose, and the status of the
policy is endogenously determined in the model, based on the distance of the actual interest rate
from that required by the Taylor rule. Hence, in our model parameter time evolution is endogenously
determined.
In addition, we allow for exogenous breaks in the parameters, since the consequences of monetary
policy could depend not only on its stance but also on the credibility of the central bank and other
factors, and it is di¢ cult to explicitly model the latter. For example, a credible central bank can
￿ght in￿ ation with low output losses while a non credible central bank could su⁄er high output
losses from adopting a tight monetary policy (e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler, (1999) and Goodfriend
1and King (2005)). Hence, the dynamic responses of output and in￿ ation to a monetary shock could
di⁄er not only when policy is loose or tight but also when it is credible or non credible.
In comparison with a range of speci￿cations, our model ￿ts the data quite well, and the main
results we obtain are the following. First, there is strong evidence of an exogenous break in the
parameters, whose date is estimated at 1985Q1. Interestingly, the credibility measure derived in
Demertzis et al. (2008) steadily decreases from the early 70s until around 1985, and increases
afterwards. The Laxton and Diaye (2002) credibility measure also shows a marked jump around
1985. Both measures are based on the fact that long-term in￿ ation expectations should be anchored
at the implicit or explicit in￿ ation target of the central bank, when the latter is credible. The marked
increase in both credibility measures in 1985 suggests that, notwithstanding the tight policy of the
early ￿ 80s, it took some time to restore the central bank credibility lost in the ￿ 70s. This credibility
interpretation of the break in 1985 is also supported by the fact that in our model changes in the
policy rate during the restrictive regime have smaller e⁄ects on output and stronger negative e⁄ects
on in￿ ation after 1985. However, we are aware that there can be several other interpretations for
the break in 1985, and therefore we stress that all our subsequent results are independent of our
credibility interpretation of the 1985 break: in the model this break is treated as exogenous with
an estimated timing.
Second, we ￿nd substantial evidence in favour of endogenous changes in the model parameters,
triggered by the extent of the deviation of the actual interest rate from that prescribed by the Taylor
rule. As a consequence, even when examining the transmission of monetary shocks with sizes that
do not change with the regime, the computed responses suggest di⁄erent transmission depending
on whether the policy stance at the impact of the shock is loose, normal or tight. In particular,
the reaction of output and prices to policy shocks is weaker in the loose regime. Moreover, and
in contrast with models with only an exogenous break, we ￿nd evidence that restrictive monetary
policy has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on output and prices when the policy shock arises during
the tight regime, even when considering the period after 1985. These di⁄erences in the monetary
transmission depending on the policy stance are stronger after the break estimated in 1985.
Third, these detected di⁄erences in monetary transmission are complemented by signi￿cant
shifts in the sizes of monetary policy shocks. The shifts in the variance-covariance matrix of the
model disturbances are caused not only by the exogenous break, but also depending on the monetary
policy stance. Before 1985, the volatility of output shocks during the loose policy of the ￿ 70s is
twice as large as in the period of tight policy in the early ￿ 80s. Similarly, after 1985, the volatility
of output when the policy rate is close to the value suggested by the Taylor rule is twice as large as
in periods of tight policy. The model also captures a large decrease in the size of monetary policy
2shocks after 1985, as well as di⁄erences related to the monetary policy stance.
Finally, a set of counterfactual experiments suggests that tight monetary policy is helpful in
reducing growth volatility and the level of in￿ ation. However, this is not su¢ cient to explain
what happened to the US growth and in￿ ation after 1985. The reduction in the volatility of the
shocks ("good luck") is also not a su¢ cient explanation, according to our model, since using the
pre-85 parameters with the post-85 shocks still generates substantial growth volatility and in￿ ation
after 1985. What is needed is a more general change in the model parameters, namely, in the
contemporaneous and dynamic transmission of the shocks. This could be related to the increased
credibility of monetary policy after 1985, or to other factors underlying the break in 1985, whose
investigation is left for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical model speci￿-
cation and estimation, and the method to compute (regime dependent and independent) impulse
response functions and their standard errors. Section 3 presents empirical results on model spec-
i￿cation, estimation, timing of the regimes and patterns of parameter time-variation. Section 4
illustrates the changing propagation of monetary shocks before and after 1985 and across policy
regimes. Section 5 contains counterfactual analyses and discusses their implications for the debate
on the sources of the great moderation. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes our endogenous threshold VAR model and how to compute impulse response
functions from this model; shows how to introduce additional exogenous breaks in the speci￿cation;
and discusses how to determine the transition variable and the number of regimes.
2.1 Endogenous Threshold VARs
2.1.1 Speci￿cation and estimation
The model employed in this paper is a modi￿cation of Tsay￿ s (1998) Threshold VAR. The main
characteristic of the model in comparison with Markov-Switching speci￿cations is that the variable
that triggers regime switching is observed. This feature makes regime chagnes easier to interpret
and estimation simpler, without loosing in terms of generality of the speci￿cation.
The threshold VAR speci￿cation of Tsay (1998) is a multivariate version of Self-Exciting Thresh-
old Models (Tong, 1990). As a consequence, the variable that triggers the regime switching is one
of the endogenous variables in the VAR. In contrast, our Endogenous Threshold Vector Autore-
gressive Model (ET-VAR) employs a combination of endogenous variables as transition variable.
3The combination of endogenous variables is computed using known (not estimated) weights, while
the values of the transition variable that trigger the regime changes are endogenously estimated.1
Let us group the (endogenous) variables of interest observed at time t into the m ￿ 1 vector
yt, and label the transition variable as xt. Recall that xt contains a combination of endogenous
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0 is an m ￿ 1 vector of intercepts for regime r (r = 1;2;3), ￿
(r)
i is an m ￿ m matrix
of coe¢ cients of lag i (i = 1;:::;p), and c1 and c2 are (unknown) threshold values. Each regime








If the threshold values were known, the observations of the transition variable xt combined with
the threshold values could be used to split the sample of yt and (yt￿1;:::;yt￿p) into subsamples (for
t = p + 1;:::;T). Hence, the usual least squares formulae could be applied to obtain the estimates
of the coe¢ cient matrices and of the variance-covariance matrices, which are also equivalent to the
maximum likelihood estimates of this reduced form model. However, the thresholds have also to be
estimated. Following Galvªo (2006), we use conditional maximum likelihood since it is an adequate
estimation method (based on a Monte Carlo exercise) when the ￿(r) may di⁄er across regimes.
Hence, estimates of the unknown thresholds are obtained as:






















t , and Tr is the number of observations in each regime. The variance-covariance
matrix is computed for each combination of threshold values in a grid, ^ ￿(r) (c1;c2), since if the
threshold is known, least squares formulae can be used to estimate the coe¢ cient matrices. The
grid of threshold values is built based on restrictions on the minimum proportion of observations
in each regime (Hansen, 2000). In the case of a model with three regimes, the value of one of the
thresholds a⁄ects the grid of values available for the second threshold, so there is a large number
of possible combinations that satisfy the restrictions on a given proportion of observations in each
1In our case the transition variable cannot be non-stationary (as Caner and Hansen (2001)), since we want to
allow for the regimes to be possibly repeated over time. As a consequence, the transition variable cannot be a time
trend, for example, since regimes de￿ned by a time trend do not repeat over time, they just de￿ne structural breaks
and subsamples.
4regime. In this paper, we use the approach described by Hansen (1999), called "one-step-at-time",
to reduce the computational burden.
Given the estimated thresholds, the remaining parameter estimates are obtained using standard




logj^ ￿(1)(^ c1;^ c2)j +
T2
2
logj^ ￿(2)(^ c1;^ c2)j +
T3
2
logj^ ￿(3)(^ c1;^ c2)j
￿
: (3)
Note that this analysis is conditional on the choice of the transition variable, xt, and of the lag
length, p. We will discuss their selection in the last subsection.
2.1.2 Impulse Response Functions for Endogenous Threshold VARs.
An implication of the ET-VAR is that the responses to shocks are regime dependent. More precisely,
the transmission of the shock relies on ￿
(r)
i , i = 1;:::;p, and the impact of the shock on ￿(r), following
eq. (1). In addition, the dynamic response to the shock can trigger a change in regime. Hence,
the computation of the response functions and their standard errors can be fairly more complex
than in the linear case, and the results quite di⁄erent. We will now provide details on the required
procedure.
To start with, let us suppose that each regime de￿nes separate subsamples, as in the case
of structural break models, such as Boivin and Giannoni (2006). We could then use a Cholesky








where ￿(r) = A(r)￿(r)A(r)0
, A(r) is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal, and
￿(r) is a diagonal matrix whose elements, ￿(r), are the variances of the structural shocks v
(r)
t . The











where j = 1;:::;m, s indicates the response horizon (s = 1;:::;h), a
(r)
j is the jth column of
A(r)(Hamilton, 1994, p. 92 and 323), and ￿
(r)
s is the proper matrix in the MA(1) representa-
tion obtained by inverting the V AR(p) conditional on being in the regime r.
When computing the conditional impulse response as described, the implicit assumption is that
a structural shock cannot not cause regime-switching. However, in practice regimes can change,
since the transition variable is a combination of endogenous variables a⁄ected by the shock. The
computation of dynamic responses that take into account the endogeneity of the regime switching
of the ET-VAR is more complex. In fact, nonlinear models in general admit a Wold representation
5(e.g., Potter (2000)), but it is not possible to derive the MA(1) representation of an ET-VAR
unconditional on the regime.
To compute unconditional dynamic responses, we must consider, for example, that a shock v
(r)
j;t
impacting the system in regime 1, that is, xt ￿ c1, could generate an e⁄ect such that xt+s￿1 > c1
(so that the system switches to regime 2 in period t + s) or even xt+s￿1 > c2 (switch to regime
3). Moreover, whether or not the switch takes place depends not only on the impact and dynamic
response to the shock, but also on the current and past values of the endogenous variables (since
there is dependence on the past trough the VAR dynamics). Hence, contrary to the standard linear
case, the history preceding the shock matters to determine its e⁄ects, and has to be considered for
the computation of the dynamic responses. Finally, the realizations of the future shocks are also
relevant, since they can also cause a regime change.
To compute the proper dynamic responses from the ET-VAR model, we make use of the concept
of generalized responses introduced by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). The response in period
t + s of regime r to a shock of size ￿
(r)




















t is a matrix containing the set of relevant histories. More precisely, let us de￿ne Wt =
(yt;:::;yt￿p+1), and ￿t = ((Wt;:::;WT)0). We then partition the matrix ￿t so that ￿
(r)
t has the
rows of ￿t that correspond to regime r. Hence, ￿
(r)





j implies that the impact of the shock computed with the unconditional responses is the
same as in the case of conditional responses.
The response to a shock with the de￿nition in (6) is computed conditional on a speci￿c regime
history at the time of the shock with no restrictions on regime switches, and averaging out the e⁄ects
of future shocks, which a⁄ect similarly both conditional means. The cost is that the conditional
means in (6) cannot be evaluated analytically but need to be computed by simulation, using the
following procedure.
Based on the estimates of ￿
(r)
i and of the thresholds, we can draw an s ￿ m vector from each
N(0;￿(r)) (for r = 1;2;3) such that sequences of y￿
t+1;:::;y￿
t+s can be computed using one row of ￿
(r)
t







j and the other with v
(r)
j;t+1 = 0. By using the same draws from each N(0;￿(r))
to compute both conditional means, we guarantee that the only di⁄erence between them is the
e⁄ect of the structural shock at t+1. Note also that the IRFr;j;s is the average across all vector of
histories in ￿
(r)
t . This means that if Tj = 50 and we draw 1000 times from N(0;￿(r)), the IRFr;j;s
is computed using the average across 50 ￿ 1000 replications. Finally, notice that the size/sign of
6the shock also matters in this context, since it can trigger a regime change. Hence, responses can
di⁄er across regimes both for the size of the shock and for its transmission to the economy.
2.1.3 Standard Errors for the Impulse Response Functions
Another important issue to be addressed is the impact of parameter uncertainty on the impulse
response functions. This means that we would like to assess the impact of using ^ ￿
(r)
i , ^ ￿(r), ^ c1 and
^ c2 obtained by conditional maximum likelihood when computing IRFr;j;s. The normal distribution
is a good approximation for that of ^ ￿
(r)
i and ^ ￿(r), provided that the threshold e⁄ect vanishes
asymptotically, but the distribution of the threshold estimates is non-standard (Hansen, 2000).
Therefore, we use the bootstrap to compute 100(1 ￿ ￿)% con￿dence intervals for the impulse
response functions.
Let us label [ IRFr;j;s the impulse response function based on the conditional maximum likelihood
estimates ^ ￿
(r)
i , ^ ￿(r), ^ c1 and ^ c2. As described by Canova (2007, p. 134), a typical issue in applying
the bootstrap to compute con￿dence intervals for impulse responses obtained from linear models
is that the bootstrapped distributions are not scale invariant, implying that standard error bands
may not include the point estimates. In addition, VAR estimates using small samples are severely
downward biased. Unfortunately, techniques of bias correction such as those described in Kilian
(1998) cannot be applied since the uncertainty in the ET-VAR parameters depends strongly on
the uncertainty about the threshold estimation, while the empirical distribution of the threshold
estimates may be quite asymmetric (Kapetanios, 2000).
Our bootstrap approach attempts to solve some of these issues. The ￿rst step is to draw with
replacement sequences of length T ￿p from all "
(r)
t (r = 1;2;3), and use the estimates ^ ￿
(r)
i , ^ ￿(r), ^ c1
and ^ c2 and initial values of yt (t = 1;:::;p) to generate bootstrapped sequences of y￿￿
p+1;:::;y￿￿
T . For
each of these sequences, conditional maximum likelihood is applied to obtain estimates of all the
parameters, that is, ^ ￿
￿￿(r)
i , ^ ￿￿￿(r), ^ c￿￿
1 and ^ c￿￿
2 . Using these parameters and the speci￿c bootstrapped
sequence, we compute IRF￿￿
r;j;s using the simulation procedure described previously. By repeating
the bootstrapped procedure B times, an empirical distribution for the IRFr;j;s is obtained.
Using the B values of IRF￿￿











r:j:s for 100(1 ￿ ￿)% con￿dence intervals. Using the empirical quantiles
and the empirical mean of the impulse response function, the range of the 100(1 ￿ ￿)% con￿dence









As a result, centred con￿dence intervals, but potentially asymmetric and skewed, can be computed
as
n
[ IRFr;j;s ￿ rgLO; [ IRFr;j;s + rgUP
o
. We emphasize that these intervals consider uncertainty on
both coe¢ cient and threshold estimates.
72.2 Endogenous Threshold VARs with a Break
There is by now strong statistical evidence on the existence of a "Great Moderation" in the variance
of output and several other macroeconomic variables at around 1985 (e.g., McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), Sensier and van Dijk (2004)). Hence, it may be necessary to add an additional break
in the speci￿cation of our ET-VAR, in order to capture parameter changes associated with the Great
Moderation that are not explained by monetary policy stances. Since it is not clear whether the
enhanced credibility of monetary policy or other phenomena underlie the Great Moderation, we
prefer not to model the determinants of this additional break in the model parameters, but rather
treat the break as exogenous, while its timing is endogenously determined.
Therefore, following Galvªo (2006), we introduce a Structural Break-Endogenous Threshold-
VAR model (SB-ET-VAR). In this model, the break date is estimated rather than exogenously
assumed, since the exact starting date of the Great Moderation is uncertain, and the characteristics
of the regimes and how regimes switch can also change after the break.
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where I(:) is an indicator function that is equal to one if the inequality is true. The inclusion of a



















































The SB-ET-VAR is an ET-VAR in each of the two subsamples de￿ned by the break date, b.
The values of the thresholds before the break are di⁄erent from the values after the break. Hence,
the regimes de￿ned by the thresholds c1 and c2 may repeat until t ￿ b. When t > b, the threshold
values are c3 and c4. The autoregressive coe¢ cients F(r) and the variance-covariance matrix ￿(r)
may di⁄er for r = 1;:::;6.
Galvªo (2006) provides Monte Carlo evidence that supports joint estimation of the thresholds
and the break date by maximum likelihood, when there are large changes in the variance of the
shocks across regimes. For each possible value of b in a grid, the sample is split and an ET-VAR
8is estimated in each resulting subsample, by solving the grid minimization problem de￿ned by (2),
using the sequential approach to de￿ne the threshold grids. The grid of b (b￿(bL;bU)) has to be
de￿ned such that there is a reasonable number of observations in each regime for the ET-VAR to
be estimated. Formalizing:
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T4
2 logj^ ￿(4)(c3;c4)j + T5




Finally, when computing impulse responses for SB-ET-VAR models, we apply the procedure
described in Section 2.1 for each subsample separately.
2.3 Choosing the Number of Regimes and Transition Variables
The vast literature on choosing the number of thresholds and break dates relies on test statistics
with non-standard distributions (e.g., Andrews (1993), Hansen (1996)), or on sequential procedures
associated with asymptotic bounds (e.g., Altissimo and Corradi (2002), Gonzalo and Pitarakis
(2002)). These methods are typically applied to univariate models, but they can be extended
to multivariate models estimated by conditional least squares when changes in the variance of
the disturbances across regimes are not important. In our application, changes in the variance-
covariance matrix across regimes are instead potentially important, and the estimation procedure
in (8) takes them into explicit account. As a consequence, the use of testing procedures based on
the full sample sum of squared errors may be misleading. In addition, the sample size we have is
rather short considering that we may have up to six di⁄erent regimes, so that formal test statistics
can be expected to have low power (see e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2005) in a related context).
An alternative simple approach is to use information criteria based on a penalised likelihood
function, where the penalty depends on the number of estimated parameters, to compare speci￿-
cations that di⁄er for the assumed number of breaks and regimes. The same method can be also
adopted for the selection of the transition variable, among the members of a pre-speci￿ed set.
We consider only the parameters in z(r) when computing the penalty function, as in Altissimo
and Corradi (2002) and Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002). Therefore, the inclusion of a further regime
in the model requires the estimation of m(mp + 1) additional parameters. The penalty function
can be 2K=T (AIC), 2log(log(K))=T (HQC) or log(K)=T (SIC), where K is number of estimated
parameters. Altissimo and Corradi (2002) suggest the HQC penalty to choose the number of
regimes in a threshold model, while Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) suggest SIC. For comparison, we
will compute all the three criteria, and use them also for the selection of the transition variable xt,
9which does not a⁄ect the penalty function but the value of the likelihood.
3 Model speci￿cation and estimation results
3.1 The Benchmark Model
The SB-ET-VAR model is built upon a small monetary VAR model, along the lines of Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005) or Boivin and Giannoni (2006). We focus on
three endogenous variables: aggregate output, prices, and the policy interest rate. We use real
GDP as the output variable, the PCE index as the price variable, and the FED fund rate as the
policy interest rate. Output and prices are measured in log-levels (100*log). This implies that
yt = (GDPt;pt;it)
0
. We consider quarterly data for the period 1960-2008.
One of our aims is to check whether the stance of monetary policy can change the transmission
of monetary policy shocks to output and prices. We identify policy shocks by means of a Cholesky
decomposition based on the ordering yt = (GDPt;pt;it)
0
, which assumes that it takes at least one
quarter for monetary policy shocks to a⁄ect output and prices, with current values of prices and
output a⁄ecting current monetary policy decisions.
As a starting point, Figure 1 presents the responses to the monetary shock in the full sample and
in the two subsamples de￿ned by a popular break date in the literature: 1985:Q1.2 The responses
before the break are familiar: an increase in interest rate decreases output and prices, but the e⁄ect
on output is faster than on prices: output starts decreasing after a few quarters, prices after about
two years. After the 1985 break, the size of the monetary policy shocks reduces dramatically, from
about 100 to 25 basis points, the e⁄ect on prices becomes smaller and generally positive, and the
e⁄ect on output is smaller, not statistically signi￿cant, and taking place after about 2 years. These
￿ndings are broadly consistent with those in Boivin and Giannoni (2006), though they split the
sample in 1979 and use slightly di⁄erent variables. If the VAR is estimated over the entire sample,
there is a massive price puzzle, while the reactions of output and the dynamics of the interest rate
are a mixture of those observed over the two subsamples. This ￿nding suggests that a constant
parameter model is not appropriate.
A potential weakness of the VAR speci￿cation with a break is the limited information set used
to identify the monetary policy shock, since only three variables are employed. However, the fact
that the shock has the expected e⁄ects on output and prices before 1985 suggests that this is not
such a major problem. The cause of the counterintuitive results after 1985 could instead be due to
2These results are based on a lag length of p = 2, which is the autogressive order chosen by HQC and AIC for
both subsamples.
10a modi￿cation of the VAR parameters, including the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks. In
addition, even within each of the two subsamples the results could di⁄er, depending for example on
the monetary policy stance or on the business cycle conditions. Modelling the variables with our
SB-ET-VAR could address these issues and improve our understanding of the e⁄ects of monetary
policy.
3.2 Choosing a SB-ET-VAR Speci￿cation
An important step in specifying SB-ET-VAR models is the selection of the transition variable.
Cechetti et al (2007) employ changes in the sign and size of the deviations from the Taylor rule as a
measure of changes in the stance of the monetary policy. The time series of the deviations from the
Taylor rule is then employed to assess whether changes in monetary policy can explain the great
moderation in a group of countries. We use a similar measure as the ￿rst possible speci￿cation for
the transition variable. Speci￿cally, we de￿ne the deviations from the Taylor rule as:
xt = 1 + 1:5(pt ￿ pt￿4) + 0:5(GDPt ￿ GDPt￿4) ￿ it: (9)
Our interpretation of using equation (9) as transition variable in the SB-ET-VAR is that xt indicates
how monetary policy should have been conducted, while the interest rate equation of the VAR tracks
the actual monetary policy. If actual monetary policy followed exactly the Taylor rule underlying
(9), the dynamics of the VAR could be described by a single regime. Instead, switches in the sign
and size of xt indicate that actual monetary policy evolves over time, being in some periods in line
with the Taylor rule, and in other periods either looser or tighter than requested.
Two other possible choices for the transition variable in the SB-ET-VAR are the real interest
rate, xa
t = it￿(pt￿pt￿4), and the growth rate of output, xb
t = (GDPt￿GDPt￿4). The real interest
rate provides another measure of the stance of monetary policy, without considering the economic
activity; it can be considered as a policy rule that depends only on in￿ ation. Both xt and xa
t were
assessed by Gali (2008) within the context of a simple new-keynesian model. The output growth
rate is a typical transition variable employed when measuring the e⁄ects of business cycle phases
(expansions/contractions) on the responses to shocks.
A second key requirement for the speci￿cation of SB-ET-VAR models is to understand how many
regimes are needed, and whether a simpli￿ed version without either the SB or the ET component
would su¢ ce. Note that the SB-VAR speci￿cation is similar to the split-sample benchmark model
reported above, but with an estimated rather than a priori imposed break date.
Focusing ￿rst on the Taylor rule based transition variable, we compare a full sample VAR, an
ET-VAR model with 2 or 3 regimes, an SB-VAR model with 2 or 3 regimes, and an SB-ET-VAR
11model with one break and 2 or 3 regimes in the ET component (for a total of 4 and 6 regimes,
respectively). When de￿ning the grid to estimate the models with thresholds and breaks, we set
restrictions based on the minimum proportion of observations in each regime in a given subsample.
Speci￿cally, we consider 15% or 30% proportions.3 The two upper panels of Table 1 report
information criteria for all these alternative speci￿cations.
It turns out that the benchmark model with just one break (SB-VAR with 2 regimes) ￿ts really
well the data in comparison with a full sample VAR. The ET-VAR with three regimes is also better
than the VAR, that is, there is evidence of endogenous regime switches when using the Taylor rule as
transition variable. However, the SB-VAR is preferred to the ET-VAR. Putting together the break
and threshold features to obtain the SB-ET-VAR model with six regimes yields the lowest AIC
and HQC when at least 15% of observations are allowed in each regime. With 30% of observations,
the SB-ET-VAR is best according to the AIC. In both cases, the other criteria are minimized by
the SB-VAR with two regimes, that is close to the benchmark speci￿cation. However, as we will
see, the SB-ET-VAR generates interesting di⁄erences in the shock responses within each of the two
subsamples identi￿ed by the SB speci￿cation, and responses more in line with economic theory.
Hence, we will adopt an SB-ET-VAR speci￿cation with one break and two thresholds (6 regimes).
When the SB-ET-VAR speci￿cation is estimated with either the real interest rate or output
growth as transition variables, all the information criteria are higher than those corresponding to
the Taylor rule based transition variable, xt in equation (9), see the lower panel of Table 1. Hence,
we will continue our analysis based on an SB-ET-VAR model with xt as the transition variable.
A ￿nal interesting issue to consider is whether our approach manages to capture the het-
eroscedasticity usually found in the residuals of similar VAR models (Primiceri, 2006). We can
test for remaining conditional heteroscedasticity by regressing the squared residuals from the (6-
regime) SB-ET-VAR on dummies representing changes in the variance for each regime, and on
lagged squared residuals. Under the null hypothesis of no remaining heteroscedasticity, an F-test
for the non-signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients of the lagged squared residuals should not reject. The
results presented in Table 2 suggest no evidence of remaining heteroscedasticity in the output and
price equations. There is instead some evidence of heteroscedasticity in the interest rate equation,
but a split sample analysis reveals that it is a characteristic of the pre 1985 period only. Based on
this analysis, we can conclude that our SB-ET-VAR captures su¢ ciently well also changes in the
variances of the shocks a⁄ecting the three variables under analysis.
3In the case of an SB-ET-VAR model, this restriction applies separately for each subsample. Other papers in the
literature normally set the proportion equal to 10 or 15%. However, because of the relative short sample size and the
impact that parameter estimates have on impulse responses, we also consider at least 30% of observations in each
regime (which in a SB-ET-VAR model means 10% of T observations in each regime).
123.3 The Chronology of Regimes
In this subsection we discuss three main results. First, the break date for the SB-ET-VAR, which
was estimated in 1985Q1. Second, the estimates of the thresholds, which are ^ c1 = 1:68 and ^ c2 = 3:92
before the break and ^ c3 = :18 and ^ c4 = 2:25 afterward. Third, the time series of the Taylor rule
deviations (xt￿1 using (9)), and the regime-switching function de￿ning the chronology of the (six)
regimes.
About the break date, the endogenously determined date of 1985Q1 is slightly later than the
tightening of monetary policy and of the beginning of the great moderation. Figure 2 shows that
after 1985Q1 there is a major increase in the credibility of the monetary policy authority, according
to both the Laxton Diaye (2002) and the Demertzis et al. (2008) credibility measures. We are aware
of the existence of several other possible explanations for the break in 1985, such as learning by the
policy makers, faster globalization, improvements in inventory management, etc. As mentioned,
we do not want to investigate this issue further since we want to focus on the consequences of the
monetary regime changes, and therefore we treat the break as exogenous. However, we believe that
our proposed credibility based explanation for the identi￿ed break in 1985 is sensible and in line
with the response functions that we will compute later on. In particular, a more credible central
bank that implements a restrictive policy should incur lower output losses and be more successful
in ￿ghting in￿ ation, see e.g. Goodfriend and King (2005), which is exactly what we ￿nd on average
after 1985.
About the endogenously estimated thresholds, which induce switches in the monetary policy
stance from loose to neutral and tight (and viceversa), it is noticeable that they are about 150 basis
points lower after 1985. This implies, for example, that before 1985 a tight policy (regime 1) is
associated with interest rate values that satisfy
it > 1:5(pt ￿ pt￿4) + 0:5(GDPt ￿ GDPt￿4) ￿ :68 ,
while after 1985 (regime 4) it must be
it > 1:5(pt ￿ pt￿4) + 0:5(GDPt ￿ GDPt￿4) + 82 .
Therefore, for a given level of in￿ ation and output growth, the interest rate must be about 150
basis points higher after 1985 for the policy to be classi￿ed as tight. In other words, what was
considered a tight policy before 1985 could be no longer tight after 1985 but just neutral.
Similarly, a loose policy (regime 3) before 1985 requires
it < 1:5(pt ￿ pt￿4) + 0:5(GDPt ￿ GDPt￿4) ￿ 2:92
13while after 1985 (regime 6) it must be
it < 1:5(pt ￿ pt￿4) + 0:5(GDPt ￿ GDPt￿4) ￿ 1:25
Hence, the interest rate should be much lower before 1985 for a policy to be considered as loose.
Therefore, a loose policy after 1985 could have been considered neutral before 1985, and a neutral
one tight.
Finally, the resulting chronology of regimes is plotted in Figure 3. It turns out that the tight
monetary policy before 1985 (regime 1, xt < ^ c1 = 1:68) is mainly identi￿ed in the 1980-84 period,
with some shorter episodes in the ￿ 60s, while the period of loose monetary policy (regime 3, xt >
^ c2 = 3:92) is largely associated with the 70￿ s. After the 1985 break, it is harder to associate regimes
with time periods, since the regime-switching is more frequent among all three regimes. However,
the loose monetary policy (regime 6, xt > ^ c4 = 2:25) is mainly associated with the 2002-2006
period.
3.4 Time-varying estimates
We now discuss the estimated parameters of our SB-ET-VAR, starting with those of the conditional
mean.
The three panels of Figure 4 report the evolution across regimes of the sum of the AR(1) and
AR(2) estimated coe¢ cients on GDP, prices and the interest rate for, respectively, the output,
prices and interest rate equations.4 We report the sum of the two coe¢ cients rather than each of
them separately in order to increase the readability. We have also standardized the values in order
to make the relative sizes of the changes in parameters comparable across variables and equations.
We use Figure 4 to evaluate whether parameter changes are concentrated in some key parameters
or they are generalised.
Starting with the output equation, before 1985 there is little parameter movement across the
loose, normal and tight regimes, while after 1985 there are large switches in all coe¢ cients, with
values also fairly di⁄erent from those before 1985. A similar picture emerges for the price equation,
while for the interest rate equation there are substantial di⁄erences across regimes also before 1985.
It is di¢ cult to attribute a structural interpretation to the parameter movements at this stage,
since the model is just a reduced form. However, Figure 4 suggests generalised changes in the
conditional mean parameters both before and after 1985, and across regimes, even though the
volatilities of the shocks are allowed to change over time.
4The values are obtained from the estimates of z
(r) in (8) for r = 1;:::;6.
14The next question we address is how much the variance of the shocks has changed, and whether
the changes are only related to the great moderation or also to the monetary policy regimes. The
upper panel of Figure 5 illustrates how the variance of the output shock was drastically reduced
after 1985 (and we remember that in our model this date is endogenously determined rather than
a priori imposed).5 But there are also some interesting changes across regimes, in particular before
1985, with large values during the loose monetary policy period of the ￿ 70s in comparison with the
tight regime in the beginning of the ￿ 80s. After 1985, the volatility of output when the current
policy rate is in line with the Taylor rule (regime 5) is twice as large as during periods of tight
policy (regime 4).
The reduction in the variance of the monetary shock after 1985 is even larger than that for the
output shock, and also in this case the di⁄erences across regimes are more marked in the pre-1985
period. Interestingly, there are instead no major changes in the variance of the price shock.
The ￿nal question we address is whether the contemporaneous transmission of the output and
price shocks to the interest rate has changed. The lower panel of Figure 5 reports the evolution
of the relevant coe¢ cients in the A(r) matrix (see section 2.2). The values are larger in absolute
value and more volatile before 1985. After 1985 the role of output is approximately constant across
regimes, while there are relevant swings in that of in￿ ation.
In summary, this subsection provides evidence in favour of changes in the size of the shocks
(in particular for output and the policy rate), in their contemporaneous transmission (in particular
before and after 1985), and in their dynamic transmission, both before and after 1985 and across
regimes. Hence, models that focus on changes in only one of these elements would have problems
in properly estimating the consequences of monetary policy shocks.
4 The e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks across regimes
We now discuss how the e⁄ects of monetary policy have changed over time and across regimes,
according to our estimated SB-ET-VAR model. In the previous section, we have detected substan-
tial changes in the average size of the shocks that, due to the nonlinearity of the model, could by
themselves determine also changes in their transmission. For example, a large shock can trigger
more easily switches in regimes than a smaller shock. However, as argued by Boivin et al (2009),
from an economic point of view it is more interesting and informative to focus on changes in the
transmission of a monetary policy shock of a ￿xed size. Hence, Figures 6-8 present the dynamic
response to a 25 basis point increase in the interest rate at time t of the interest rate (Figure 6),
5The reported values are the estimates of the variances of the structural shocks vt(r) in (4), i.e., ￿
(r)
j for r = 1;:::;6.
15output (Figure 7) and prices (Figure 8).
The responses (black line) are computed as described in equation (6), that is, they are the
average response over all histories from a speci￿c regime allowing for regime-switching over the
horizon of up to 20 quarters. All six regimes identi￿ed in the estimated SB-ET-VAR are represented
in the ￿gures. We recall that regimes 1 and 4 describe tight monetary policy before and after the
1985 break, while regimes 3 and 6 are associated with loose monetary policy. The plots also include
68% and 90% con￿dence intervals computed by the bootstrap procedure described in Section 2,
and the responses computed without allowing for regime switching as a consequence of the shocks
(eq. 5).
We use Figures 6-8 to answer two main questions. First, is there any statistical evidence in
favour of signi￿cant di⁄erences in the transmission of shocks across regimes? Second, are there any
changes in the transmission of shocks that can be associated with the "good policy" story?
With reference to the ￿rst question, Figures 6-8 present evidence that the transmission of
monetary policy shocks is indeed a⁄ected by the monetary policy stance, in particular after 1985.
In the tight regime (regime 4), the monetary shocks are substantially less persistent than in the
loose regime 6 (marginal e⁄ect of .1 in contrast to .3 after 8 quarters). The e⁄ects on output and
prices also di⁄er, with a negative and signi￿cant reaction only in the tight regime. Before 1985,
there are also some changes in the transmission across regimes, though less evident than after 1985.
In particular, there is a reversion e⁄ect on the interest rate response in regimes 1 and 2 that is not
observed in regime 3; a stronger negative e⁄ect on prices at long horizons in the tight regime in
comparison with the loose regime; and a stronger e⁄ect on the output response after 8 quarters in
the middle regime in comparison with the outer regimes.
About the second question, we also ￿nd some support for "good policy" as a driver of the
great moderation. In particular, as mentioned before, Figure 3 illustrates that the early ￿ 80s were
characterized by a long period of tight policy that likely re-established the credibility of the central
bank, magnifying the e⁄ects of the continued tight policy after 1985 and up to about 1987 (again
see Figure 3). Speci￿cally, the dynamic response of the interest rate in the tight regimes 1 and
4 (Figure 6) are similar up to 8 quarters. However, the e⁄ects on prices and output are rather
di⁄erent. Before 1985, it takes 10 quarters to ￿nd evidence of a negative e⁄ect on prices, while this
happens already after 1 quarter after 1985 (Figure 8). The transmission on output also changes.
The negative e⁄ect on output is faster before 1985 than after 1985, although the marginal e⁄ect
after 8 quarters (around -.3) is similar. Similar changes in the reaction of output and prices before
and after 1985 are observed for the normal policy regimes 2 and 5, where the actual interest rate
is close to that required by the Taylor rule.
16In comparison with studies such as Boivin et al (2009), our model allows us to shift the focus
from changes in the transmission of monetary policy shocks caused by changes of the chairman of
the Federal Reserve Bank (around the end of 70￿ s and beginning of the 80￿ s) to endogenous changes
caused by how strictly following a Taylor rule. The evidence provided in Figures 6-8 supports the
claim that the monetary policy stance, measured by the size and sign of the deviations from the
stabilizing Taylor rule, characterizes regimes where the same shock has a di⁄erent e⁄ect on output,
prices and the interest rate itself.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the responses that do not allow for a regime switch triggered
by the dynamic transmission of the shock (the dashed lines in Figure 6-8). In a few cases, in
particular during the loose regimes 3 and 6, they can be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the responses
that we have commented so far. Hence, in order to avoid biased results, it is important to allow for
the shock to trigger a change in regime rather than simply conditioning the responses on a given
regime.
To conclude and summarize, using our SB-ET-VAR model, this Section has highlighted changes
in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output, in￿ ation, and the interest rate itself, related
to a di⁄erent monetary policy stance. With ￿xed size shocks, there are statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erences in shock tranmission across regimes only after 1985. However, when allowing also for
the detected changes in shock size, the responses di⁄er substantially across regimes even before 1985.
In addition, the tight ("good") policy of the early and mid ￿ 80s contributed to the stabilization of
in￿ ation, by triggering a fast and negative impact of a restrictive policy on prices. We will further
qualify this statement in the next section.
5 Counterfactual analysis
The previous Sections have shown that the contemporaneous and dynamic relationships across
output, prices and interest rates are quite di⁄erent before and after 1985 and across regimes of
loose, normal and tight monetary policy. In this Section we speculate on what would have happened
if a single monetary regime was in place over the entire sample period, or if the coe¢ cients of
a given regime did not change before and after 1985. The ￿rst type of experiment could shed
light, for example, on what would have happened if the monetary policy followed rather closely a
Taylor rule over the entire sample, a "good policy story". The second type of experiment would
provide additional information about the role of the structural break in 1985, likely associated
with the regained credibility of the central bank and often considered as the beginning of the great
moderation.
17Of course this kind of counterfactual analysis is open to a wide range of criticisms. Therefore,
we do not want to provide any strong policy advice based on the results. We just think of these
experiments as another useful way to analyze the properties of our SB-ET-VAR model, and to get
information on the relative role of good policy and good luck in determining the lower volatility of
output and the lower level and volatility of in￿ ation after 1985.
Let us start with counterfactuals based on a single policy regime. From the computational point
of view, we use the estimated coe¢ cients from the regime of a given policy stance before and after
1985 (e.g., regimes 2 and 5 in the case of normal policy), the actual values for output, prices and
interest rate in 1960Q1 and 1985Q1 as starting values, and then solve the model forward ￿rst for
1960Q2-1985Q1 and then for 1985Q2-2009Q1, adding in each period the estimated SB-ET-VAR
residuals. In this way we obtain generated time series for the three variables, conditional on being
always in a speci￿c monetary policy stance. In Figure 9 we report the resulting series for output,
prices and interest rate assuming normal policy for the entire period (small deviations from Taylor
rule), together with the actual time series.
According to the upper panel of Figure 9, a Taylor rule based monetary policy would have
increased the volatility of output during the 1960-1984 period, yielding in particular higher growth
during the recoveries following the recessions of 1974 and 1981-82, and during the period 1978-
79. The rationale for this positive growth result is the much lower interest rates resulting from
the lower panel of Figure 9 around 1974 and 1981-82. But there is a cost: the much higher and
persistent in￿ ation during 1979-1984, see the middle panel of Figure 9. Interestingly, the interest
rate spike in 1979-80 is compatible with a normal (Taylor rule based) policy, the di⁄erence is with
the subsequent behaviour of the interest rate, which was kept at an higher level than that required
by the Taylor rule (indeed the post 1980 period is identi￿ed as a tight regime, see Figure 3).
It is also important to mention that the decrease in in￿ ation after 1985 resulting from Figure 9
is mostly due to the re-iniziatialization of the simulated series (based on the actual 1985Q1 value
of in￿ ation) and to the new set of parameters characterizing the normal regime (see Figure 4). In
other words, without these changes, in￿ ation would have remained at a higher level for a longer
period. Hence, the parameter break in 1985 played an important role and good policy by itself
(broadly following a Taylor rule) does not seem su¢ cient to lower in￿ ation and the volatility of
output.
Looking at the post 1985 period, being in a normal regime would have implied on average
slightly lower interest rates over the 1995-2003 period, but higher ones afterwards (again in line
with the timing of the regimes in Figure 3). Overall, there would have been slightly positive average
e⁄ects on output, and no costs in terms of higher in￿ ation.
18Given the important consequences of the 1985 break emerging from the ￿rst type of counter-
factual, we now consider an experiment that let us better assess its role. From the computational
point of view, we use the estimated coe¢ cients for the tight, normal and loose regimes before 1985
(including the estimated thresholds) for the entire sample period, actual values for output, prices
and interest rate in 1985Q1, and then solve the model forward for the period 1985Q2-2009Q1,
adding in each period the estimated SB-ET-VAR residuals. In this way we obtain generated time
series for the three variables, conditional on the pre-1985 parameters but on the post-1985 shocks.
The resulting series for output, prices and interest rate are reported in Figure 10.
If the Great Moderation, that is, the reduction in the volatility of output and in￿ ation (and
other variables), was purely due to "good luck", namely to smaller shocks, it should emerge from
Figure 10, since the simulated values are based on the post-1985 shocks, whose variance is indeed
smaller than in the pre-1985 period (see Figure 5). Instead, both the levels and the volatility of
output and in￿ ation are fairly close to the pre-1985 values, actually even higher.
The ￿nal exercise we consider is a mixture of the ￿rst two cases. Speci￿cally, we use the pre-1985
parameters coming from the tight policy regime only, to simulate data for the post-1985 period,
conditional on the post-1985 SB-ET-VAR residuals. The goal is to understand whether a tight
policy enforced over the entire post-1985 period, combined with the smaller post-85 shocks, could
have reduced the volatility of output and the level and volatility of in￿ ation, in the absence of the
parameter changes that took place around 1985. The results are reported in Figure 11.
A comparison of Figures 10 and 11 shows that the tighter monetary policy is indeed helpful
in reducing the volatility of output and the level of in￿ ation, but it is de￿nitely not su¢ cient to
replicate the actual behaviour, of growth, in￿ ation, and the interest rate.
Overall, the lesson from this Section is that good monetary policy is helpful in reducing growth
volatility and the level of in￿ ation. However, this is not su¢ cient to explain what happened to
the US growth and in￿ ation after 1985. The reduction in the volatility of the shocks is also not
a su¢ cient explanation, according to our model, since using the pre-85 VAR parameters with the
post-85 shocks still generates substantial growth volatility and in￿ ation after 1985. What is needed
is a more general change in the VAR parameters, namely, in the contemporaneous and dynamic
transmission of the shocks. This could be related to the increased credibility of monetary policy,
or to other factors, whose investigation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
196 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the changing transmission mechanism of monetary
policy by introducing a model whose parameter evolution explicitly depends on the conduct of
monetary policy. More precisely, we model prices, aggregate output, and the policy interest rate
with a structural break endogenous threshold VAR speci￿cation (SB-ET-VAR), whose parameters
are subject to a structural break at an estimated date and to periodic changes related to how close
or far the interest rate is from the level prescribed by the Taylor rule.
The resulting model, with a break in the ￿rst quarter of 1985 and three regimes in each of
the subperiods identi￿ed by the break date, ￿ts the data well. In addition, we ￿nd substantial
evidence of changes both in the parameters of the conditional means of the three variables, and in
the variances of the output and interest rate shocks.
The model generates responses of output and prices to monetary policy shocks changing not
only before and after 1985 but also according to the monetary policy stance. Restrictive monetary
policy has stronger negative e⁄ects on output before 1985, but takes time to reduce prices, even
during the tight policy regime. After 1985, on average across regimes, the e⁄ects on output are
smaller and prices decrease faster, particularly so during a tight or normal policy regime. These
results suggest that the 1985 break could be associated with the regained credibility of the central
bank, which makes monetary policy more e⁄ective in ￿ghting in￿ ation and less costly in terms of
output loss. In addition, they indicate that good policy matters when the central bank is credible:
after 1985 the FED could indeed decrease in￿ ation with small output costs by increasing the interest
rate.
A set of counterfactual experiments con￿rms that good monetary policy is helpful for reducing
the level of in￿ ation, and also the volatility of output growth. However, the extent of the reduction
is not su¢ cient to explain what happened to the US growth and in￿ ation after 1985. The reduction
in the volatility of the shocks is also not a su¢ cient explanation, according to our model, since using
the pre-85 VAR parameters with the post-85 shocks still generates substantial growth volatility and
in￿ ation after 1985.
Therefore, we conclude that good policy and good luck were relevant to explain part of the
reduction in the level and volatility of in￿ ation and growth. However, the bulk of the reduction
seems to be due to a more general change in the model parameters, namely, in the contemporaneous
and dynamic transmission of the monetary shocks and output and in￿ ation. We suggest that the
change is related to the regained credibility of the FED, but this is an issue that deserves additional
investigation in future research.
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Figure 1: The effects of (one-standard deviation) monetary policy shocks in a constant parameter VAR and 
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Deviations from the Taylor rule and Regime Switching
Dev. Taylor rule trans. Function: reg1:0; reg2:.2, reg3:.4; reg4:.6; reg5: .8; reg6:1
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variation of Fed rate Equation Coefficients
GDP(t-1+t-2) P(t-1+t-2) FED(t-1+t-2)
 
Figure 4: Time-varying estimates:  sum of coefficients of both lags of each variable in each 




































































































































































Variation of the Elements of the Λ matrix 
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Variation of the Elements of the A matrix
a31 (from output) a32 (from prices)
 
Figure 5: Time-varying estimates: Variance of structural shocks (upper panel) and of coefficients in 
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shocks (25 basis point shock): IRFs with 68% (dark grey) and 90% (light grey) confidence intervals. Dashed black line is 
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Figure 7: Responses of output to monetary policy shocks (25 basis point shock): IRFs with 68% (dark grey) and 90% (light grey) confidence intervals. 
Dashed black line is response when regime-switching is not allowed. Regimes 1 (4), 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to tight, normal and loose monetary policy 
before 1985Q1 (after 1985Q1).  
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Figure 8: Responses of Prices to Monetary Policy Shocks (25 basis point shock): IRFs with 68% (dark grey) and 90% (light grey) confidence intervals. 
Dashed black line is response when regime-switching is not allowed. Regimes 1 (4), 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to tight, normal and loose monetary policy 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9. Counterfactual:  Always in the normal regime (reg2 and reg5) in each subsample. Black line is 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10. Counterfactual:  Using pre-1985 estimates (including threshold values) for the period after 1985 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: Counterfactual: Using the tight regime estimated with data before 1985 (regime 1) during the 
post-1985 period. Black line is observed data; grey line is simulated counterfactual.   
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Table 1: Measures of Fit of Different Specifications 
Model N.  Regimes Lik  AIC HQC SIC 
Specifications with Taylor rule as Transition Variable  
(with at least 15% obs. in each regime in each subsample) 
VAR 1  -537.673 5.70 5.84  6.05 
ET-VAR 2  -874.180 9.35 9.63  10.05 
SB-VAR 2  -422.533 4.74 5.02  5.44 
ET-VAR 3  -440.664 5.14 5.57  6.19 
SB-VAR 3  -383.481 4.56 4.98  5.61 
SB-ET-VAR 4 -466.281 5.62 6.18  7.02 
SB-ET-VAR 6 -261.917 3.96 4.81  6.07 
Specifications with Taylor rule as Transition Variable  
(with at least 30% obs. in each regime in each subsample) 
ET-VAR 2  -689.114 7.46 7.74  8.16 
SB-VAR 2  -422.533 4.74 5.02 5.44 
ET-VAR 3  -452.218 5.26 5.68  6.31 
SB-VAR 3  -392.211 4.65 5.07  5.70 
SB-ET-VAR 4 -466.281 5.62 6.18  7.02 
SB-ET-VAR 6 -305.687 4.41 5.26 6.51 
Specification with Real Interest Rate as Transition Variable  
(with at least 30% obs. in each regime in each subsample) 
SB-ET-VAR 6 -315.813 4.51 5.36  6.62 
Specification with Output Growth as Transition Variable  
(with at least 30% obs. in each regime in each subsample) 
SB-ET-VAR 6 -313.113 4.48 5.33  6.59 




Table 2: Tests for remaining heteroscedasticity in the SB-ET-VAR (6 regimes) 
Test on Disturbances from:  Wald [pv] 
Output equation  4.39 [.11] 
Price equation  3.99[.14] 
Fed fund equation  17.80[.01] 
Fed fund equation 
(first subsample) 
9.07[.01] 
Fed fund equation 
(second subsample) 
1.62[0.44] 
Note: The test statistics are computed with an auxiliary regression (LM) of 
squared residuals on dummies to capture regime-dependent changes and with 
two lags of squared residuals. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is that 
the coefficients on the lag-squared disturbances are zero.  
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